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Abstract
Experiments on intertemporal consumption typically show that
people have difficulties in optimally solving this kind of problems. Pre-
vious studies have focused on contexts in which agents are faced with
risk on future income and have to plan over long horizons. We present
an experiment comparing decision making under certainty, risk and
ambiguity, over a shorter life-cycle. Results show that planning in the
ambiguity treatment is markedly different than in the risk condition
and it is characterized by a significant pattern of under-consumption.
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1 Introduction
The question of how people cope with solving dynamic optimization problems
has been often tested in economics. Several contributions in the literature,
including experimental and empirical studies, have shown how people may
have difficulties in optimally solving intertemporal consumption/saving prob-
lems1. Results have generally shown that participants fail to optimise lifetime
utility, in some cases deviating significantly from the optimal consumption
strategy (Hey and Dardanoni (1988); Ballinger et al. (2003, 2011); Carbone
and Hey (2004) as well as Brown et al. (2009)). Other contributions have
found evidence of how learning and cognitive abilities may play an important
role in improving intertemporal planning2.
Experiments on intertemporal consumption/saving problems have typ-
ically involved making decisions under risk on the distribution of income
(over the life-cycle). In all these cases, participants have knowledge of the
stochastic process determining income, no matter the specific procedure (or
mechanism) employed. In other words, participants know in advance, or
are able to easily determine the probability of receiving a specific level of
income (or income shock). Alternatively, such stochastic process could be
completely unknown to participants, who would then have to plan under
1For a review see, among others, Hall (1978), Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi
(1996). This studies also contribute in underlining problems of misspecification and the
necessity for better specializations of the general model, e.g. taking better account of
precautionary motives (see also Carroll (1997)) or time non separable preferences (See,
among others, Dynan (2000); Guariglia and Rossi (2002); Carrasco et al. (2005))
2For an account see Fehr and Zych (1998); Ballinger et al. (2003); Carbone and Hey
(2004); Hey (2008); Brown et al. (2009); Ballinger et al. (2011)
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ambiguity. This would entail having some prior beliefs about probabilities
and a mechanism to update them. It would not be unreasonable to think
that many people everyday are faced with consumption/saving decisions un-
der ambiguity about future income. As far as we know, there are no studies
that test experimentally people’s ability to solve this kind of problems in this
specific context.
Other studies also report on people’s difficulties in planning ahead, possi-
bly due to the length of the planning horizon (see Carbone and Hey (2004);
Hey and Panaccione (2011) or Hey and Knoll (2007, 2011)). In particular,
Ballinger et al. (2003) and Carbone and Hey (2004) include a discussion on
the estimation of the planning horizon that participants seem to actually
use to solve the inter-temporal consumption problem. They find evidence of
myopic behaviour in both cases of life-cycles of 25 (Carbone and Hey, 2004)
and 60 periods (Ballinger et al., 2003). These authors conclude that not
only people may be short-sighted relative to the optimal planning horizon,
but that there seems to be a significant variability across subjects. For this
reason we decided to run this test with a relatively short horizon. Intuitively,
shorter planning horizons might allow agents to reach the optimal solution
more easily.
The aim of this experiment is to explore how subjects solve a stochastic
optimisation problem in three different decision-making contexts: certainty,
risk and ambiguity, in the specific case of a very short life-cycle. Results
show that planning in the ambiguity treatment is markedly different than
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in the risk condition. We also find that even in presence of an (unusually)
short planning horizon, participants still seem to have difficulties in finding
the optimal solution.
The theoretical background for this study is described in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 presents the experimental design while results are analyzed in Section
4 and discussed in Section 5.
2 Theory
Consider an agent living for a discrete number of periods (T ) and having
intertemporal preferences represented by the Discounted Utility model with
a discount rate equal to zero. In each period, she receives utility from con-
sumption; utility is assumed to have a functional form of the CARA type:
U(c) =
(
k − e
−ρc
ρ
)
α,
where ”c” is consumption, α and k are scaling factors.
In the case of decision making under risk, the objective of our agent is
then to maximize the expected lifetime utility, that is3
maxEt
[
T∑
t=1
βU(ct)
]
(1)
subject to
3Having set the discount rate equal to zero, β equals 1, so the same can be expressed
by: E(U(ct) + U(ct+1) + · · ·+ U(T )).
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wt+1 = at+1 + y = (1 + r)(wt − ct) + y
where w is available wealth, a represents available assets or savings at
the beginning of period t + 1 and y is income. In each period of her life-
cycle, the agent receives either a high or a low income, with probabilities
p = q = 0.5. The rate of return is known and held fixed during the lifecycle.
Also, borrowing is not allowed, that is, wealth must always be greater or
at most equal to zero. Finally, the agent has no bequest motives, that is,
any savings are lost after the last period (T ). The problem is then to choose
the sequence of consumption (from period 1 to period T ) that maximizes (1).
The optimal strategy under risk assumes Expected Utility (EU) decision-
makers who work with the true objective probabilities. Under ambiguity,
as we have implemented it, subjects do not know the true probabilities and
therefore EU cannot be applied. There are many models of behavior under
ambiguity and we choose the simplest - that is, Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) theory, assuming that subjective probabilities are 0.5.
The standard procedure to solve this kind of problems is to use Dynamic
Programming4. The Bellman Equation of the problem has been determined
as
Vt(wt) = U(c
∗
t ) + E
[
Vt+1(w
∗
t+1)
]
(2)
4See among others Deaton (1992) and Stokey et al. (1989)
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where Vt is the value function, wt represents available wealth and E is
the expectation operator5. The value function establishes a recursive rela-
tion between current and future decisions. The expectation is resolved by
considering the two possible events: low income and high income. Wealth in
period t + 1 is optimal because it is determined by the (optimal) consump-
tion choice in t. Using backward induction, the agent starts from the last
period (T ), where the optimal solution is obviously to consume all wealth,
then moves backwards period by period, choosing the optimal level of con-
sumption which maximizes the value function of that period, until the first
period is reached. This allows the determination of optimal consumption as
a function of wealth (wt) and time (t).
Some restrictions have been imposed on variables. In particular, as an-
ticipated, borrowing is not allowed (wt ≥ 0) and all variables are rounded to
the second decimal figure. For this reason, while in the case of certainty it
was possible to determine the exact solution of the problem, in the case of
risk and ambiguity a numerical solution (also using interpolation) had to be
used6.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment is composed of three treatments, denominated ”certainty”,
”risk” and ”ambiguity”. Participants were randomly assigned to each treat-
ment. The rate of interest (r) was fixed at 0.4, while income was set equal to
5Starred variables indicate optimal choices
6The optimization programs were written using Maple
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10 tokens in the certainty case and to 5 and 15 tokens in the cases of risk and
ambiguity. The probability of high or low income was equal to 0.5. The pa-
rameters of the utility function, presented in the experiment as a ”conversion
function” from tokens to money, were set as follows: ρ = 0.1; α = 0.45 and
k = 10. The experiment was run at LABSI at the University of Siena. Thirty
undergraduate students took part in three sessions, one for each treatment.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Each session involved playing five sequences, each one
composed of five periods. In each period of a sequence subjects were asked
to decide how much to convert out of their available tokens (the sum of in-
come, previous savings and interest) knowing that any tokens not converted
would yield interest. In the risk and ambiguity treatments, in each period
income was determined by a random draw from an opaque bag containing
equal numbers of two coloured balls. In the case of risk, at the beginning
of the experiment, one participant was asked to publicly open the bag and
count the balls7. After each draw, the ball was placed back into the bag so as
to not alter the probability of future draws. Instructions also clarified that
any savings left at the end of the last period would be worthless. In order to
allow participants to check the consequences of their decisions, a calculator
was made available in each period8. At the beginning of each period and
at the end of a sequence, participants were shown a table summarizing the
consequences of their decisions reporting income, available wealth, conver-
sion, savings, interest gained and earnings (in the previous period or in the
7This was omitted in the case of ambiguity
8Participants were also provided with tables showing some examples of conversions and
of the interest mechanism.
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whole sequence, period by period). Participants could enter numbers with
up to two decimal digits for conversion. At the end of the experiment one of
the five sequences played was randomly selected for payment using a public
procedure.
4 Results and discussion
Table 1 presents a summary of the experiment showing, for each treatment,
three different types of information. In the top part of the table there is a
comparison between the theoretical maximum utility (labeled ”Opt. Ut.”)
and the average total utility achieved by participants in that treatment (along
with its standard deviation)9. Results show that all deviations are negative.
More interestingly, the second part of Table 1 shows that they are also all sta-
tistically significant, according to one–sample parametric and non-parametric
tests (t-test and signed rank test), which suggests that participants, on aver-
age, did not maximize utility. Also, deviations in the case of decision making
under ambiguity are generally slightly greater than those in other treatments.
Moreover, deviations show a similar pattern of variability across treatments:
usually higher in the first and second sequences and lower in the following
repetitions. Finally, the third part of Table 1 shows the root mean squared
deviation (RMSD) for each sequence and each treatment, in the cases of un-
conditional and conditional optimum. The main difference here is the point
of reference: while unconditional optimum represents the solution to the in-
tertemporal problem and is calculated on optimal wealth (hence assuming
9Here we refer to the ”ex–post” optimum, i.e. the optimal solution calculated after
income realizations
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optimal behaviour throughout the lifecycle), conditional optimum is com-
puted based on actual wealth, and is traditionally assumed to incorporate a
measure of improvement of behaviour10. As Table 1 shows, this index tends
to decrease across sequences, suggesting an improvement in strategy during
the experiment.
In general the presence of significant deviations from unconditional opti-
mum suggests that participants did not use the optimal strategy. Moreover
this analysis shows that subjects in the ambiguity treatment deviate more
from optimum.
4.1 Estimated planning horizon
Following Ballinger et al. (2003) and Carbone and Hey (2004) the apparent
planning horizon used by participants has been estimated, sequence by se-
quence for each treatment. Planning horizons have been estimated in two
stages. First, the optimal path for each possible planning horizon has been
calculated using the optimal consumption functions. The apparent planning
horizon was then identified as the one minimizing the mean squared deviation
from optimal consumption (both unconditional and conditional optima were
considered). The Null Hypothesis that the average actual and optimal plan-
ning horizons are the same has then been tested using both the Signed Rank
test and the t-test11 (one–sample tests). Results show that in the cases of cer-
10Further discussions on the concepts of conditional and unconditional optima can be
found in Ballinger et al. (2003); Carbone and Hey (2004).
11Tables ??, ?? and ??, relative to the three treatments are reported in Appendix ??.
The results of the statistical tests are available on request
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tainty and risk the average apparent horizon is always significantly shorter
than optimal. In the ambiguity case, the average actual planning horizon
seems to be longer than the one used in other treatments. Indeed, statistical
tests confirm that there is no statistical difference with the optimal horizon
in the first three sequences, when considering unconditional optimum and in
two cases when considering the conditional optimum.
This result is somewhat at odds with initial findings, suggesting that
in the case of decision making under ambiguity participants deviated more
from maximum utility. A possible explanation for this could be that given the
very short length of the lifecycle, some (possibly extreme) strategies might
cause biased estimations. An ”informal” analysis of this hypothesis has high-
lighted that saving ”aggressively” (i.e. most or all of available wealth) in
the first/second periods seems to result in an estimated planning horizon of
four/five periods. This phenomenon seems to be more evident when looking
at data from the risk and ambiguity treatments. For this reason and in order
to investigate the existence of regularities that influenced the estimation of
actual planning horizons, the distribution of the fraction of consumption over
available wealth, for all treatments has been analyzed.
4.2 Consumption-to-wealth ratios
For each treatment and each sequence, the comparison between the optimal
consumption-to-wealth ratio (c∗/w∗) and the average of actual ratios has
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been computed12. Graphs in Figure 1 compare treatments with respect to
deviations from optimal ratios. The ”x-axis” represents a deviation equal to
zero, while positive and negative values can be interpreted as instances of
over– and under–consumption. An interesting finding, immediately visible
from the graphs, is that in the case of ambiguity, ratios are consistently
below zero (implying an average under-spending with respect to optimum)
and consistently below the other two treatments. This finding, together
with the pattern described at the end of the previous subsection, might help
explain the apparent contradiction between deviations from optimum and
estimated planning horizons.
4.3 Comparing risk and ambiguity
Table 2 and table 3 show the comparison between risk and ambiguity in
each period of each sequence and when pooling data together, respectively.
Two-sample tests (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney and t-test) have been carried
out on the average deviations from conditional optimum. Results reported
in table 2 show that, in periods 1 to 413, the behaviour under ambiguity is
different from the behaviour under risk. More specifically, in the ambiguity
treatment we observe a trend of under-consumption, with a bigger average
deviation from conditional optimum (in absolute value) compared to the risk
case. In the risk treatment behaviour seems to be more ”unstable”: in some
cases actual consumption is above conditional optimum, in others it falls
12A table reporting optimal and average actual ratios (with their standard deviations)
and deviations, is available on request.
13Period 5 is not relevant because participants were clearly instructed that ”leftovers”
after the last periods would be lost
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below it. Table 2 shows that risk and ambiguity treatments are significantly
different in sequence 2 (periods 3 and 4) and sequence 3 (periods 2 and 3).
However, when looking at the general picture, average deviations in cases of
risk and ambiguity are generally very far apart (different). Table 3, where
data from all sequences are pooled together, shows that aside from period
one, the ambiguity treatment is always significantly different from the risk
treatment. While the behaviour under risk exhibits over-consumption at
the beginning of the horizon (and under-consumption in the second half,
as typically reported in the literature), the ambiguity treatment exhibits a
persistent pattern of (average) under-consumption. Also, in the ambiguity
case, average deviations are almost always negative in sequences 1 to 3, while
in sequences 4 and 5 they become positive in the first period and negative
elsewhere. This ”learning” effect in the last two sequences, can be interpreted
in the following way: in Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory, subjects
have subjective probabilities which may or may not be the true probabilities.
As they get more information about the possible states of the world14, they
update their beliefs. By the time they got to the last round of the last
sequence, they had observed 25 draws from the bag. By then, they would
have a pretty good idea of the true probabilities. Obviously, we cannot get
inside the subjects minds and observe their subjective probabilities at each
stage, but we can make two guesses at what they might be thinking. One
guess is that, in the absence of information to the contrary, they would start
by assuming that each state was equally likely; evidence from the draws
14Which was the case in this experiment as there was a fresh draw from the ambiguous
bag after each round of each sequence
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would conform that. The second guess is that the probability of the good
state was low, and this would steadily be revised upwards in the light of the
observations, this seems to be the case of our experimental subjects. We
should note that if we use SEU to explain the behavior of our subjects, then
it is all to do with their subjective probabilities; there is no parameter of
ambiguity aversion.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an experiment designed to study intertemporal consump-
tion choices, in the cases of certainty, risk, and ambiguity about future in-
come, over a short planning horizon. Results show that even when faced
with an unusual short life-cycle participants failed to plan optimally, in all
treatments.
More interestingly, results show that subjects behaviour in the ambiguity
treatment was markedly different from that in the case of risk. Not having
information about the distribution of future income seems to have triggered
significant savings across most of the sequences. In particular, in the first
three sequences of the experiment participants have (on average ) under-
consumed (with respect to conditional optimum) throughout the lifecycle.
This result is strikingly different from what has been typically reported in
the literature. However, by the last two sequences the pattern of deviations
has shifted to average over-consumption, in the early periods of the lifecycle,
followed by under-consumption in later ones. We believe that this result is
13
directly connected to the learning process about the (unknown) probabili-
ties which seem to have induced more precautionary savings out of wealth
available for consumption.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary of Treatments
Certainty
Seq 1 Seq 2 Seq 3 Seq 4 Seq 5
Opt. UT 15.0512 15.0512 15.0512 15.0512 15.0512
AVG UT 13.0315 13.4179 14.0075 14.6501 14.3830
s.d. 2.8566 1.9157 1.5755 0.2788 0.7570
Deviation -2.0197 -1.6333 -1.0437 -0.4011 -0.6682
H0: AVG UT=Opt.UT
t-test (t=) -2.2359 -2.6962 -2.0949 -4.5500 -2.7913
signed rank (z=) -2.8030 -2.8030 -2.8030 -2.8030 -2.8030
RMSD
unc.opt. 10.62 10.66 9.22 3.85 4.64
cond.opt. 9.11 6.45 5.19 2.32 2.97
Risk
Seq 1 Seq 2 Seq 3 Seq 4 Seq 5
Opt. UT 16.2700 16.0500 15.5800 15.2300 14.4200
AVG UT 13.0700 14.7528 15.0037 14.5218 13.1952
s.d. 3.0791 0.8527 0.8205 0.7353 0.7713
Deviation -3.2000 -1.2972 -0.5763 -0.7082 -1.2248
H0: AVG UT=Opt.UT
t-test (t=) -3.2829 -4.8105 -2.2213 -3.0457 -5.0212
signed rank (z=) -2.8050 -2.8030 -1.7840 -2.8050 -2.8050
RMSD
unc.opt. 18.01 7.29 6.87 6.58 5.51
cond.opt. 10.14 4.20 3.95 3.76 3.45
Ambiguity
Seq 1 Seq 2 Seq 3 Seq 4 Seq 5
Opt. UT 16.0501 16.0974 12.2909 13.9571 15.2293
AVG UT 12.6472 12.9356 10.2075 12.8590 13.8737
s.d. 3.1820 1.6900 0.8572 0.9386 0.8564
Deviation -3.4029 -3.1618 -2.0834 -1.0981 -1.3555
H0: AVG UT=Opt.UT
t-test (t=) -3.3819 -5.9162 -7.6862 -3.6998 -5.0053
signed rank (z=) -2.8030 -2.8030 -2.8030 -2.4970 -2.8030
RMSD
unc.opt. 20.41 8.97 5.00 7.64 6.30
cond.opt. 13.36 6.98 3.90 4.59 3.70
Significant results reported in bold
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Table 2: Comparing Risk and Ambiguity Sequence by Sequence
Periods
Sequence 1 2 3 4 5
1
AVG (risk) 0.58 -0.44 -3.892 -9.011 -0.001
AVG (amb) -2.942 -4.844 -8.90527 -11.51 -0.004
WMW z=1.33 z=1.36 z=1.51 z=1.44 z=2.01
p=0.18 p=0.17 p=0.13 p=0.15 p=0.045
2
AVG (risk) 1.53 -1.5 1.524 0.586981 -0.001
AVG (amb) -1.228 0.74 -2.784 -7.534 -0.016
WMW z=1.56 z=-1.13 z=2.00 z=2.57 z=2.37
p=0.12 p=0.26 p=0.045 p=0.01 p=0.18
3
AVG (risk) -0.62 1.68 2.478 0.326731 -0.001
AVG (amb) -1.528 -1.64127 -1.024 -2.84627 -0.011
WMW z=0.85 z=2.27 z=2.12 z=1.82 z=1.63
p=0.4 p=0.02 p=0.03 p=0.07 p=0.1
4
AVG (risk) -0.37 2.475 0.805269 -0.43507 -0.002
AVG (amb) 1.48 -1.08 -2.242 -3.78073 -0.069
WMW z=-1.18 z=1.89 z=1.74 z=1.36 z=1.72
p=0.24 p=0.06 p=0.08 p=0.17 p=0.09
5
AVG (risk) 2.83 -0.056 -1.74646 -0.593 -0.002
AVG (amb) 2.336 -0.844 -1.49702 -2.65327 -0.009
WMW z=0.53 z=0.53 z=0.57 z=0.3 z=1.91
p=0.59 p=0.6 p=0.57 p=0.76 p=0.06
AVG(risk) and AVG(amb) indicate average deviations from conditional
optimum (expressed in tokens). WMW: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
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Table 3: Comparing Risk and Ambiguity - Pooled Data
Periods
1 2 3 4 5
AVG (risk) 0.79 0.43 -0.17 -1.83 -0.001
AVG (amb) -0.376 -1.53 -3.29 -5.66 -0.021
WMW
z=1.39 z=2.68 z=3.42 z=3.22 z=4.35
p=0.16 p=0.007 p=0.0006 p=0.001 p=0.000
t-test
t=1.524 t=1.957 t=2.636 t=2.026 t=1.651
p=0.065 p=0.026 p=0.005 p=0.023 p=0.051
AVG(risk) and AVG(amb) indicate average deviations from conditional
optimum (expressed in tokens). WMW: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
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Figures
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 1: Deviations from optimal ”c-to-w” ratio
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